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Summary
The international carbon markets are currently
suffering from extremely low carbon prices.
The reason for this is a fundamental imbalance 
of supply and demand for carbon credits.
While the supply has ever grown, demand is
fixed and limited. With the adoption of a se­
cond commitment period of the Kyoto Proto­
col without large emitters such as Japan, Can­
ada and Russia, this situation has anything but 
changed.
This Policy Brief aims to sketch the options to 
stabilize the market prices in the short term
and to avoid the complete halt of the market. 
Options to increase demand as well as options 
to restrict supply have been looked at. Mid­
term and long-term options, by contrast, are 
not analysed.
These options were analysed regarding their 
potential to do so along three main criteria:
their quantitative impact, their signalling effect 
for the future of the carbon market and their 
political and market acceptability. Central pros 
and cons for every option are summarized in a 
table below.
Only two options where found to be likely to 
have significant impact on the market. Increas­
ing the level of ambition would send a strong 
signal and could restore market participants’
faith in the future of the mechanism. Under the 
current fiscal and economic crisis and given the 
long debate on increased ambition for exam­
ple within the EU, this option is, however,
highly unlikely to be implemented.
The second option that could send a similarly 
strong signal would be the use of international
climate finance to purchase excess CERs via the 
Green Climate Fund or other vehicles. The GCF 
is supposedly large enough to create credible,
additional and long-term demand and thus 
alter the supply-demand balance. However,
this option could conflict with principles of 
appropriate mitigation and particularly appro­
priate support that are to be met by the GCF. It
would furthermore set the GCF on a route 
towards project-based mitigation, potentially
replicating issues of the CDM regarding envi­
ronmental integrity, sustainable development 
and equitable geographical distribution of 
support, which many seek to avoid in the 
context of the GCF. Implementing stringent 
selection criteria and supporting specific pro­
jects via the primary market could be an option 
to overcome these drawbacks. However, this 
would also limit the GCF’s potential to stabilize 
carbon markets as a whole.
None of the other options discussed bear the 
potential to single-handedly address the cur­
rent crisis. They are either too small in scope, 
too difficult to implement in a timely manner 
or have undesired side-effects.
If parties want to stop the brain drain from 
international carbon markets and to safeguard 
that capacities in developing countries can be 
maintained, which have been tediously built
up, other more target-oriented approaches 
have to be found. With stringent selection 
criteria in place and with a focus on projects / 
programmes that provide a perspective in line 
with what is desired in a future climate change 
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Summary of options to stabilize carbon markets 
Demand-side options 
+ strong signal to carbon markets 
1) More ambitious targets + additional long-term demand 
- unlikely to be agreed upon 
2) Extended use for compliance - low potential due to lack of ambition 
+ easy to implement voluntarily 
3) Extended use for non-compliance goals + target-oriented support of projects is possible 
- sufficient scale unlikely in the face of budgetary and economic crisis 
+ potentially large sources of additional long-term demand 
4) CER use in emerging ETSs outside the + ETS covered sectors form no longer CDM potential 
Kyoto Protocol 	 – little interest by implementing countries to make use of CERs 

– only mid- to long-term perspective 

+ potential for increased use 
5) CER use in voluntary markets 	 – small volume of voluntary markets is not sufficient to address supply­
demand imbalance 
+ GCF is potentially large enough to create sufficient demand 
+ short-term availability 
+ target-oriented support for specific project types, regions or modalities 
if strong eligibility criteria are applied 
6) Introduction of a Fund or use of the GCF – NAMA principles not reflected when CERs are purchased from second­
ary markets 
– further market fragmentation if only selected (primary market) CERs 
are eligible 
– no possibility to alter absolute supply-demand balance 
– little chance to abate price volatility due to speculative nature of CER 7) Introduction of a CER reserve bank 
prices 
– unclear up-front financing of the bank 
– unilateral floor prices distort market prices 
8) Introduction of a floor price – do not increase but decrease demand for offsets 
– global floor price would require fundamental makeover of the CDM 
Supply-side options 
+ reduced supply 
+ easy implementation 
9) Restriction of eligibility of projects – no clear signal on the future of the mechanism 
– limiting the mechanisms potential 
- unlikely to be agreed on 
+ improved environmental integrity 10) Rigorous assessment of projects 
– no short-term effect since only future projects are affected 
+ significantly reduced supply or increased demand 
+ improved environmental integrity 
+ implementation possible unilaterally on the demand side 
11) Discounting of Credits – implementation on the supply side requires fundamental revision of 
the CDM modalities and procedures 
– requires additional ambition that is unlikely in the face of the fiscal 
crisis 
+ reduced supply 
+ improved environmental integrity 
12) Application of ambitious baselines – implementation would require overhaul of CDM and its methodologies 
– would apply for future CER supply only 
– only long-term effects 
+ strong impact on CER supply 
13) Limiting projects to one crediting  – difficult to implement politically 
period – strong resistance from project developers 
– no signal for long-term perspective 
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1 Introduction  
During COP18 in Doha the outcome of the 
high-level CDM Policy Dialogue was extensively 
discussed. In the last minute a recommendation 
had been inserted into the Policy Dialogue’s
report “to investigate the establishment of a new 
fund and/or enable existing or emerging funds to 
purchase and to cancel part of the current over­
hang of CERs. National governments could be 
invited to meet part of their commitments to 
international carbon [sic!] finance through contri­
butions to this fund.“1 
This initiative is originated in fears over the 
collapse of the regulated carbon markets. The 
markets for CERs and ERUs have faced extreme­
ly low prices recently because of the imbalance 
of increasing supply of and ever diminishing 
demand for CERs and ERUs. CDC Climat esti­
mates mid-term demand for CERs to be be­
tween 1.6 and 1.9 billion tonnes CO2e. At the 
same they forecast the CDM to supply the 
required CERs as soon as 2014. They therefore 
conclude that prices could fall to nil as soon as 
2014.2 
Given the certainty about supply and the result­
ing lack of scarcity that can be deducted from 
the CDM pipeline, it is obvious that current CER 
prices do not reflect abatement costs but are 
rather based on speculative expectations of 
future demand.
This Policy Brief sketches the options to stabi­
lize market prices in the short term. The analysis 
is guided by three main criteria: the quantita­
tive impact on the supply-demand balance, to 
what extent the measures sends a signal for the 
long-term development of the market and both 
political and market acceptability.  
1CDM-Policy Dialogue – Report (2012), p. 26.
2Bellassen, Stephan and Leguet (2012). 
The paper is structured according to the market 
side that the discussed measures apply to.
Measures that increase or widen the sources of 
demand are summarized in chapter 2. Options 
include more ambitious emission reduction 
targets by Kyoto parties, extended use of CERs 
for purposes other than compliance and be­
yond the borders of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
introduction of a fund to purchase CERs, a 
carbon market reserve bank and carbon floor 
prices.
Chapter 3 summarizes options to restrict sup­
ply. These measures are often deemed to be 
less constructive than demand-side options as 
they limit the scope of the CDM and thus limit
its potential.3 However, supply-side measures 
are already being implemented widely. For 
example, the EU-ETS has ruled out CERs from
specific project types and will only allow credits 
from projects registered after 2012 if these are 
located in least developed countries. Although 
these measures are implemented on the de­
mand side, they affect the supply of CERs and 
are hence discussed in this chapter. 
Alongside restrictions on the origin of credits 
and on project types, the date of issuance or 
project registration, a temporary halt of issu­
ance of credits, a more rigorous assessment of 
projects, discounting of credits on both supply 
and demand-side and the application of ambi­
tious crediting baselines below business-as­
usual are briefly discussed.
Chapter 4 concludes with recommendations on 
which options have the potential to stabilize 
carbon markets especially in the short term.
 
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2 Demand-Side Options  
The collapse of international carbon markets is
the result of lack of demand on the internation­
al level, leading to a massive oversupply of 
CERs. To address this imbalance two possible 
routes are available. Restricting supply and 
thereby shrinking the potential and scope of 
the carbon market or increasing demand and 
thus scaling up the mechanism. The latter of 
these two routes is preferred by many as the 
CDM and carbon markets in general have been 
perceived as a valuable, functioning mecha­
nism and as a tool that has still potential for 
development.
In this section we focus on options that increase 
demand. To have a significant effect, any pro­
posed measure should signal the continuation 
of the mechanisms and markets. Market prices 
are currently only of speculative nature. They 
do not represent actual mitigation costs but 
merely reflect market participants’ expectations 
about future climate legislation, that is, future
demand for carbon credits.
The second challenge is the structural imbal­
ance of supply and demand. Some scholars 
argue that the CDM in its current form will 
always have an oversupply problem because 
the technical potential for generating credits 
will always be much greater than what indus­
trialised countries can absorb.4 Even if this is not 
the case, one-shot interventions are not likely 
to have a significant effect on markets, even if 
they absorb a majority of the current oversup­
ply. As long as they do not provide a long-term 
perspective for continuous demand that can 
take up the large supply potential, it is unlikely 
that measures have a significant effect on 
carbon markets. 
4 Korthuis (2013). 
2.1 More ambitious targets 
The most obvious measure to stabilize interna­
tional carbon markets would be an increase of 
the ambition of mitigation targets. It is, howev­
er, not very probable that countries can agree 
on raising ambition in the short term. The 
second commitment period of the Kyoto Proto­
col has only been settled recently. With major 
emitters such as Japan, Russia and Canada not 
committing to binding emission reduction 
targets, it became obvious that political support 
for the KP is diminishing.
One gleam of hope may remain: The remaining 
Annex B countries agreed to review their com­
mitments with regards to the level of ambition 
by 2014 to ensure that targets are in line with 
stabilizing global warming below 2°C.5 In De­
cember 2014 the 5th Assessment Report of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is
due to be published. Earlier editions of this
report have consistently raised public concerns, 
attracted wide media coverage, increased 
pressure on political leaders and thus created a 
window of opportunity for increased ambition. 
In the past, raising of ambition has proven 
difficult. The EU, as the largest emitter still 
committing to binding emission reductions and 
thus as the largest potential source of demand 
for offsets, has struggled to raise its emission 
reduction goal. Already in 2008 the EU commit­
ted itself to reduce emissions by 20 per cent till 
2020 and to raise its level of ambition to 30 per 
cent in case other countries commit to compa­
rable efforts. Five years later member countries 
are still discussing to move to the more strin­ 
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gent target even though emissions have al­
ready drastically fallen and the EU is close to 
meeting its goal much earlier than anticipated.6 
Climate policy is even more controversial in
Australia, the other remaining large emitter in
the Kyoto Protocol. General elections will be
held this year and the current opposition leader 
Abbot has made a “pledge in blood” to repeal
the carbon pricing legislation should he be­
come Prime Minister.7 
An increased level of ambition may not neces­
sarily stabilize compliance markets. Even if the 
countries that have committed to binding 
emission reductions under the Kyoto Protocol’s
second commitment period increase the level
of ambition, it is unclear to what extent this
increased ambition would be offset with the 
use of CERs or ERUs. However, even if the in­
creased ambition does not translate into in­
creased demand for offsets, it should have a 
positive effect on carbon markets. An increase 
of the level of ambition on the international 
level through more stringent commitments 
could support the private sectors’ belief in the 
continuity of strong mitigation efforts. The 
private sector might thus regain trust in carbon 
markets and speculative prices could increase,
based on buyers’ expectations of future de­
mand. This effect will, however, occur only if 
other conditions such as the institutional conti­
nuity of the CDM are met and a perspective for 
the CDM beyond 2020 remains open. 
2.2 Promoting extended Use of 
CERs/ERUs for compliance 
Another possibility to increase demand for 
offsets would be to allow for a larger part of 
existing emission reduction obligations to be  
6 European Commission (2012). 
7 The Australian (2011). 
met by the use of offsets. In the Marrakech 
Accords parties decided to allow the use of 
offsetting “supplemental” to domestic emission 
reductions. Many interpret this term as follows: 
The use of offsets must not exceed 50 per cent 
of the overall emission reductions. However, a 
number of countries do not make full use of this
quota and restrict the use of offsets more strin­
gently. In the EU-ETS, for example, the amount 
of offsets that can be used is fixed. It estimated 
at roughly 1.65 billion tonnes between 2008 
and 2020, not making full use of the 50% quo­
ta.8 If countries increased this offsetting quota,
demand for CERs and ERUs would increase and 
market prices could stabilize. 
The European Environment Agency9 estimates 
that the EU is going to overachieve its emission 
reduction obligation in the non-ETS sectors by 
1% to 8% of 2005 emissions, subject to if and 
which additional mitigation measures are 
implemented. Only 6 countries(Luxembourg,
Ireland, Malta, Belgium, Greece) are projected 
to fall short of their 2020 targets. This number 
could grow to 15 countries, 10  if additional
mitigation measures currently being planned 
are not implemented. Consequently, there is 
only very limited space to increase the usage of 
offsetting for compliance in the European non-
ETS sectors. 
Not only the international carbon markets 
struggle from large oversupply. Also the EU­
ETS, the single largest source of demand for 
offsets, struggles. Prices have sored in recent 
years. In 2007, when the national allocation 
plans (NAPs) were established, policy makers 
based their decisions on expectations of future 
economic growth that fundamentally proofed 
wrong with the beginning of the financial and 
resulting economic crisis in Europe. In conse­ 
8 Bellassen, Stephan and Leguet (2012). 

9 EEA (2012). 

10 Countries include Denmark, Austria, Finland, Estonia, 
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quence, numerous companies, regulated under 
the EU-ETS, possess many more emission al­
lowances than they actually need, even if they 
refrain from using offsets for compliance.11 This 
oversupply poses a threat to the functioning of 
the EU-ETS even disregarding the use of offsets. 
Within the European Union different measures 
are being discussed to stabilize the EU-ETS. 
Under these circumstances it is hardly plausible 
that the EU would increase the use of offsets 
under the EU-ETS since it would further aggra­
vate the oversupply of units in the system – at 
least not within the current target. 
Australia recently even decided to reduce the 
scope for using CERs. Entities covered by the 
Australian ETS will be allowed to cover 50% of 
their compliance obligations through interna­
tional units from 2015. Initially, only Kyoto units 
were supposed to be eligible and the expecta­
tion was that Australia would become a sub­
stantial source of demand, up to nearly 100 Mt 
annually by 2020. However, in 2012, Australia 
decided to also accept EUAs as an interim step 
towards full linking of the two systems. In this 
context, Australia announced that it would limit 
use of Kyoto units to 12.5% of entities’ compli­
ance obligations, which effectively reserves the 
lion’s share of the international units quota for 
EU allowances.12 
2.3 Promoting Use of CERs/ERUs 
for non-compliance goals of 
Kyoto-Parties
Apart from increased emission reduction obli­
gations, Kyoto parties could voluntarily buy and 
cancel CERs or ERUs additional to credits need­
ed to achieve compliance. Countries could issue 
sovereign purchase programmes to do so. 
11Sandbag (2013). 
12 see Kachi et al. (2012), p 28.
An advantage for interested countries could be 
increased flexibility with regards to the ‘no-lose’ 
character of additional voluntary pledges.
Furthermore, in the EU context it could be the 
last resort for countries that are willing to show
increased effort to bypass blocked EU internal
negotiations on increased ambition.
Additional beyond-compliance use of CERs by 
Kyoto parties could potentially ease the mas­
sive oversupply of CERs. However, it would 
probably only have a moderate effect. In the 
face of the budget crisis of numerous European 
countries it is very unlikely that sufficient fund­
ing is available to effectively restore scarcity of 
offsets. Currently, excess CERs are estimated to 
amount to roughly 1 billion.13Since this meas­
ure does not address the structural imbalance 
between supply and demand, it is unlikely that 
carbon markets would significantly adjust their 
expectations regarding future carbon prices 
and the continuity of the market itself. A pro­
found impact on carbon prices is therefore 
unlikely.  
By concentrating on the primary market and 
investing in selected CDM projects, voluntary 
sovereign purchase programs could, however,
help to secure the existence of the mechanism
and the advancement of its methodologies.
One initiative that has opted for that route is 
the World Bank’s Carbon Initiative for Devel­
opment (CI-Dev). In February 2012 the World 
Bank proposed a new Initiative which “aims at 
helping low-income countries create sustainable 
access to financing for low-carbon investments 
through carbon markets.”14It will focus on sup­
porting energy access programs in least devel­
oped countries. The initiative is built on the 
ample experience the World Bank has in this 
field. 
 
13 Seppänen et al. (2013), p. 43. 
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The initiative comprises two components: A 
Readiness Fund supports capacity building and 
advocacy work in least developed countries for 
the development of standardized baselines, 
new methodologies and improved energy 
access programs. The Financing Fund will 
provide performance-based payments to ener­
gy access programs by purchasing CERs. The 
British government, which has supported the 
initiative from its beginnings, is planning to 
retire CERs obtained through the program.
Other CERs may be sold on the secondary 
market.
Ci-Dev does, however, explicitly not see itself as 
a means to stabilize carbon markets but rather 
as an innovative tool to lend performance­
based support to energy access programs to 
aid development in least developed countries.15 
2.4 Extend Use of CERs/ERUs 
beyond Kyoto-Parties 
So far, only countries that have committed to 
binding emission reduction obligations in­
scribed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol have 
been allowed to use CERs. In the past a number 
of industrialized countries have tried to open 
up this restriction to allow for a wider use of 
CERs. Developing countries have countered 
these attempts in the hope to incentivize 
broader participation in the Kyoto Protocol.
However, with the decision of the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and 
the non-participation of Russia, New Zealand,
Japan and Canada, this bargaining chip has 
been rendered essentially useless. It is therefore 
within the realm of possibility that the oppos­
ing countries abandon their position and allow 
for a wider use of the CDM. 
15 personal communication with Klaus Oppermann, Team 
Leader Policy and Methodology Team at World Bank’s 
Carbon Finance Unit.
The CDM Executive Board has in fact already 
provided an institutional framework for doing 
so. Whereas previously CERs could only be 
cancelled in the registry of an Annex B Kyoto 
Party, the Board decided in 2012 that project 
participants may request the cancellation of 
CERs in the CDM registry. Therefore, now any­
body may buy CERs and have them cancelled.
This decision was strongly supported by the 
developing country members of the Board.
2.4.1 Use in ETSs outside Kyoto 
Around the world emissions trading schemes 
are being proposed and implemented. Proba­
bly the most advanced examples for such 
developments are the newly started Californian 
ETS under the Global Warming Solutions Act 
(AB32) and the South Korean ETS that is sched­
uled to start in 2015.However, while both initia­
tives are envisaging the use of offsets, none of 
them will likely allow for the use of CERs in the 
near future. 
The Californian ETS is estimated to be worth 
some 50 billion USD per year. Hence, it will be
the second largest ETS in the world and could 
accordingly create substantial demand for 
offsets. Californian entities will be able to cover 
up to 8% of their compliance obligation 
through offsets. The 8% limit cumulatively 
translates to about 200 million tonnes by 2020 
but international offsets are currently not eligi­
ble.16After initially considering limited eligibility 
of CERs, the state’s regulatory agency in charge 
of the ETS, the California Air Resources Board 
(CARB), in the end decided not to allow its use 
for compliance, inter alia due to concerns about 
the CDM’s environmental integrity.17 
In South Korea, it is likely that priority will be
put on domestic emission reductions and that 
 
16 Point Carbon (2012b).
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international offsets will hence be completely 
excluded till 2020.18 
The situation in China is a little different. The 
development of a national ETS in China could 
have a significant impact on CER supplies. Even 
if international offsets are not allowed under 
the Chinese ETS, covered sectors could no 
longer be the object of CDM projects, unless 
double counting is not ruled out.
China plans to allow Chinese CERs (CCERs) for 
compliance in its proposed national ETS. New 
CDM-type projects and CDM projects that have 
not been issued CERs so far are deemed to be 
eligible. The Chinese national ETS could thus 
significantly cut CER supply, if a major share of
Chinese CDM potential is covered by an ETS 
and the remaining potential is absorbed as 
CCERs by the domestic ETS.19 
Although pilot ETSs in China are due to start 
working already in 2013, the Chinese govern­
ment has apparently revisited the schedule for 
implementing a national ETS. The 12th five-year­
plan initially targeted the ETS to be implement­
ed in 2015. This goal was, however, reinterpret­
ed. The ETS is now to be developed from 2015 
and to be up and working sometime around 
2020.20 
2.4.2	 Extended Use in the voluntary 
carbon markets 
Voluntary carbon markets are a potential source 
of demand. Companies can purchase CERs or 
ERUs to offset their emissions and voluntarily
cancel these credits. The decision of the Board 
to allow cancellation of CERs in the CDM regis­
try noted above was taken explicitly to promote 
use of the CDM in the voluntary market.
In 2011, the volume of voluntary carbon mar­
kets was roughly one third of the volume of the  
18 see Kachi et al. (2012), p. 32. 
19 see Seppänen et al. (2013). 
20 Parnell (2013).
primary CDM market. Although CERs are being 
used in the voluntary carbon market, their 
market share is negligible. CERs and ERUs make 
up for only 0.3 per cent of voluntary carbon 
markets.21 
There certainly is a potential to increase this 
share. A promotion of CERs for use in voluntary 
markets could thus increase overall demand for 
CDM/JI offsets. However, since the voluntary 
market itself is still relatively small compared to
the compliance markets, the potential is proba­
bly somewhat limited. 
2.5 Introduction of a Fund or 
use of an existing Fund to
purchase CERs 
There exist numerous different funds that have 
ample experience in purchasing CERs. Some
have been established to support particular 
types of projects or projects in a specific region.
Others have been entitled by individual coun­
tries to purchase CERs to be cancelled for com­
pliance. Last but not least, multilateral funds 
such as the Green Climate Fund could spend 
some of their means on CERs.  All existing funds 
have in common that they do not directly affect 
the demand-supply balance. Only if the ac­
quired CERs are retired, a fund increases abso­
lute demand.
Buying up excess CER supply could temporarily
increase prices, but a one-shot intervention is
not likely to stabilize markets. Rising prices 
would lead to rising investments in new CDM 
projects that would again restore the current
oversupply. A lasting effect could only be 
achieved by creating additional long-term
demand. Nevertheless, the UNFCCC has com­
 
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missioned research to explore the options of a 
CDM Rescue Fund.22 
To have a significant effect, such a fund would 
require substantial financial resources. The use 
of international climate finance as pledged by 
developed countries in the Copenhagen Accord 
has been proposed accordingly.
Of course, developed countries could directly 
buy up CERs and count their expenditures 
towards their climate finance commitments. 
Alternatively, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
could be mandated to do this. The GCF will 
supposedly be financially potent enough to 
create credible long-term demand. The ad-
vantage of using the GCF over direct purchases 
by developed countries would be that the GCF 
allows for central supervision and the introduc­
tion of consistent and homogenous selection 
criteria. 
The final report of the High-Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue therefore recommends 
“enabling the finance flowing into existing or 
emerging funds, such as the Green Climate Fund, 
to be used for such purposes [purchasing and 
cancelling CERs]“.23 
While the fund is still being made operational, it 
also suffers from donors’ hesitation to provide 
the necessary funding. This hesitation is often 
attributed to a lack of transparent rules for the 
distribution of the money and particularly to 
lack of sound measurement, verification and 
reporting procedures to enable surveillance of
supported capacities with regards to perfor­
mance and results. Research commissioned by 
the CDM Policy Dialogue therefore suggested 
to make use of the ample experience of the 
CDM und to use the CDM institutions to act as a 
service provider to the GCF. The GCF could 
thereby leapfrog learning processes, shortcut 
 
22 Point Carbon (2013) 

23 CDMPolicy Dialogue – Report (2012), p. 25.
 
the development of procedures and increase 
donors’ trust in the short-term.
Using CDM infrastructure for the GCF is, how­
ever, not the same as directly buying CERs.
While the former might be a promising short­
cut in getting the GCF’s mitigation window up 
and running, the latter conflicts with important 
principles of UNFCCC process and the idea of 
the GCF itself: The GCF was launched with the 
ambition to improve certainty to enterprises. 
One means specifically discussed would be to 
install a fixed price of carbon and as a result
provide a strong investment incentive. Simply
buying excess CERs from the secondary market 
would thwart that ambition. Even if it is techni­
cally possible to ensure a minimum price by 
buying up CERs, this is hardly plausible in the 
reality of climate politics. 
Furthermore, it would only consolidate the 
imbalance between emerging economies and 
least developed countries that has been evi­
dent in the CDM so far. Financial flows would 
not be directed to those regions that need 
financial support most but to countries that 
already profit extensively from the CDM. The 
GCF should lend support to developing coun­
tries implementing their nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs). By simply buying 
up CERs any reference to the appropriateness 
of the mitigation action in the respective na­
tional context and the appropriateness of the 
financial support is lost.
Also, due to the criticism regarding to environ­
mental integrity that the CDM faces, numerous 
countries including the EU see the future of 
broad mitigation mechanisms in sectoral in­
stead of project-based mechanisms. Purchasing 
excess CERs on a large scale would as a matter 
of fact set the GCF on a track towards project­
based mechanisms that could proof difficult to 
be reversed. 
A possible way forward would be not to buy 
CERs from secondary markets but instead revert 
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lines, the GCF could focus on projects in certain
regions, e.g. LDCs, or demand credits only from 
projects or Programmes of Activities with inno­
vative character that are integrated in compre­
hensive mitigation plans of the host countries.
In doing so, some of the above mentioned 
criticism could be accommodated and institu­
tions in developing countries could be sup­
ported to survive the immediate crisis of carbon 
markets. At the same time it would fragment
the market and neglect all projects and coun­
tries that do not fall under the respective guide­
lines. It can therefore not be considered to be 
suitable to stabilize carbon markets on a large 
scale.
2.6 Introduction of a CER/ERU 
reserve bank 
The final report of the High-Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue recommends “to consider 
the establishment of an institution to serve as a 
de facto reserve bank for CERs, charged with 
stabilizing the market.”24 
A monetary reserve bank typically manages a 
currency by adjusting interest rates and money 
supply based on a nation’s economic develop­
ment. To apply this model to international
carbon markets is, however, not straightfor­
ward. A “reserve bank” could not directly ma­
nipulate money supply, i.e. CER supply, because 
registration of projects and issuance of CERs is
done by the CDM Executive Board. Such an 
institution could therefore only act as a buyer 
or seller of CERs on the secondary market. A 
reserve of CERs that could be used to manipu­
late carbon prices later on would have to be 
built up in the first place. Unlike a national
reserve bank, the carbon market reserve would 
need upfront financing to build up this reserve.
Considering the international nature of the 
24 CDM Policy Dialogue – Report (2012), p. 26.
reserve bank, the sources of this funding are 
unclear.
The final report of the High-Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue states that such an institu­
tion should not be a fund but rather aim to 
make profit. These profits could then be used to 
expand the institution or to support other 
mitigation activities. 25 Given the international 
context and the limited possibilities to manipu­
late the carbon market, the role of a carbon 
market reserve bank would not much differ 
from conventional banks that are already in­
volved in the carbon market. 
Last but not least, a carbon market reserve bank 
would not alter the structural imbalance be­
tween supply and demand. It is highly unlikely 
that a reserve bank would be mandated to be 
able to retire CERs as it would interfere with 
political sovereignty of the countries involved 
even if they are duly represented in the banks 
oversight bodies. Due to the fact that current 
CER prices are of speculative nature rather than 
a result of scarce supply the bank’s possibilities 
to abate price volatility in the short-term are 
limited. 
2.7 Introduction of a (unilateral) 
floor price
Theoretically a floor price for carbon credits 
could yield a long-term incentive for invest­
ment and thus revitalize the supply-side to the 
carbon market. Yet, unless the demand-side is
being adjusted, this stabilization could only be
achieved at the expense of freely fluctuating 
market prices.
Floor prices could be introduced globally or 
unilaterally. Furthermore, it is possible to intro­
duce them on the demand-side or on the sup­
ply-side. In the following, two different  
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approaches are being presented and their 
influence on global carbon markets is dis­
cussed. 
The UK has introduced a carbon floor price. This
floor price will take effect as of April 2013. The 
aim is to support investments in climate friend­
ly technologies and to create reliable and pre­
dictable revenues for the British budget. The 
floor price is implemented via the existing 
Climate Change Levy. In the past, companies 
under the ETS could claim back a rebate of the 
CCL. This rebate will now be decreased to 
ensure a carbon price of 15.70 in 2013, 30 in
2020 and 70 in 2030.
If implemented globally, this type of incentive 
could revive demand in carbon offsets. Imple­
mented unilaterally, the floor price will incentiv­
ize more emission reductions than the EUA 
price would do. The demand for CERs is there­
fore decreased in the country that implements 
a floor price. Hence critics say that this unilat­
eral approach will only increase pressure on 
EUA prices and in the consequence of CERs 
prices. With sinking prices auctioning revenues 
of all other states will decrease.26  As a unilateral 
measure, it is not suited to support internation­
al carbon markets. 
Early on, China imposed an informal minimum
price on CERs from CDM projects in China that 
are still to be registered. Projects that expressed 
their intention to sell CERs for less than 8€ 
where simply not approved. In the face of 
plummeting carbon prices, China lowered its 
floor price to 7€ in January 2012.27 
According to Bloomberg (2012) it is getting 
harder and harder to enforce this floor price.
Despite China being by far the largest supplier 
of CERs, the effect of its carbon floor price is not 
reflected in global CER prices. The Chinese 
 
26 Sandbag (2012). 
27 Point Carbon (2012a).
unofficial carbon floor price has thus proven 
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3 Supply-side Options  
Next to measures that aim to increase demand 
for CERs it would be possible to restrict supply.
Such measures would reduce the issuance of 
CERs and thus help to achieve a more balanced 
relationship between supply and demand.
In its final report the High-Level Panel on the 
CDM Policy Dialogue emphasizes the effective­
ness of the CDM in achieving cost efficient 
emission reductions and helping developed 
countries achieving compliance. They estimate 
realized savings in this regard to be at least 3.6 
billion USD. Consequently, the High-Level Panel 
insists that“this should be taken into considera­
tion when assessing what measures to adopt, and 
particularly whether to impose measures that 
would restrict the operation of the CDM.“28 
However, in the face of immediate crisis, a 
(temporary) restriction of supply could be the 
only way to restore the balance of supply and 
demand and to safeguard the functioning of 
the mechanism until more long-term demand­
side measures take effect.
There are two possible routes to introduce 
supply side measures: They could be imple­
mented on the international level, i. e. by the 
CDM EB or another UNFCCC body or they could 
be implemented unilaterally by credit buyers.
The last option is already in use. The EU has 
restricted the use of CERs from certain types of 
projects and has limited the eligibility from
projects registered after 2012 to projects in 
least developed countries.
In the following a number of supply measures 
are briefly sketched. 
 
28 CDM-Policy Dialogue – Report (2012), p. 25.
3.1 Restricted eligibility 
The role of the CDM in a future climate change 
regime will not be the same as in the Kyoto
Protocol. Particularly if more extensive market 
mechanisms are being implemented, it is likely 
that the role of the CDM will shift away from the 
mainstream towards niches of mitigation pro­
jects that are not suitable for the envisaged 
new market mechanisms.
Restricting the CDM supply to such niches 
could theoretically safeguard the existence of 
the CDM system by levelling out supply and 
demand and at the same time prepare the CDM 
for its new role in a future climate change
regime. Obviously, this approach risks taking 
the second step before the first one since it
aims to adapt the current regime to one that 
has not yet been constructed.
However, it bears noting that for example 
Korthuis (2013) argues that the CDM in its 
current form was inexorably bound to run into 
an oversupply situation. The argument is that 
the potential for reducing emissions in develop­
ing countries is orders of magnitude higher 
than what industrialised countries could ever 
absorb, even with more stringent targets. 
Restricting the possible supply substantially is
therefore in his view the only way in which the 
CDM could be made functional for the long 
term. 
3.1.1 Restriction by type of project 
The current CDM has repeatedly been criticized 
for being not environmentally integer. Some 
specific project types, namely industrial gas 
projects, large hydro-power projects and large 
conventional power generation projects, have 
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projects are often deemed to be not additional
and at the same time generate a major share of 
all CERs.  
The EU has, therefore, prohibited the use of 
CERs from specific industrial gas projects in the 
third trading period of the EU-ETS.29 An exclu­
sion of large power projects is being proposed 
by some experts.30 
By the use of a negative list certain types of 
projects could be ruled out in the future. This
would result in reduced future supply but 
would not affect current supply and thus have 
no immediate effect on the supply-demand 
balance.
An immediate ruling out of all existing projects,
instead, would have a significant effect on 
current supply. The drawback of such measure 
would certainly be a loss of faith in the mecha­
nism itself.  
3.1.2	 Restriction by region 
In a move to support sustainable development 
of least developed countries, the EU has decid­
ed that CERs from projects registered after 2012 
will only be eligible as offsets in the EU-ETS if 
they are hosted in least developed countries.
Since the EU is by far the biggest source of 
demand for CERs in the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol, this measure will 
very likely have a strong impact on future 
supply.
Again, a retroactive exclusion from credits e.g.
from emerging economies such as China and 
India would have an immediate effect but 
hamper market participants’ faith in the CDM 
system. 
 
29 European Commission (2011). 
30 Carbon Mechanisms Review 1/2013. 
3.1.3	 Restriction by date of issu­
ance/project registration 
Theoretically, it would be possible to restrict the 
use to CERs issued or CERs from projects regis­
tered after a certain date. With regards to effect 
on the demand-supply imbalance the same 
holds as to both approaches of restricted eligi­
bility described above. 
Additional to that, it would be difficult to argue 
why some projects would be eligible and other 
projects that perform as well or even better but 
have been implemented earlier should fall out 
of the scheme. Restricting the eligibility by date 
or issuance or project registration would thus 
introduce a moment of arbitrariness that would 
certainly shatter project participants’ faith in
the mechanism.
3.2 More rigorous assessment 
of projects 
The number of projects and hence the number 
of CERs can also be reduced by applying more 
rigorous assessment standards in the approval 
process of a CDM project. More conservative 
baselines would reduce the number of CERs 
issued to a project. By more sound additionality 
assessment, likely, a fair share of projects would 
be excluded and at the same time environmen­
tal integrity of the mechanism would be im­
proved.
However, this approach has two downsides. It 
would further increase transaction costs and 
the risk of failed investments in case a proposed 
activity is dismissed. This is likely to hit regions 
hardest that are already underrepresented in
the CDM to date. Current measures to improve 
the geographical distribution of CDM projects 
focus on decreasing transaction costs for indi­
vidual CDM projects (e. g. promotion of PoAs) 
and reduced complexity of the project cycle (e. 
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move to a more rigorous assessment of projects 
to decrease supply would foil these efforts. 
The second downside is that the assessment of 
projects would only affect the project pipeline 
and not projects that are already registered.
This measure, therefore, cannot take an imme­
diate effect on supply but would instead reduce 
only future rather than current supply, since 
existing projects already oversupply current 
demand.
Another approach could be more rigorous MRV 
of registered projects. The cost for this measure 
cold be more easily calculated by project de­
velopers. Furthermore, the measure would also 
affect projects already producing CERs. Howev­
er, the effect is estimated to be too low to have 
a significant impact. 
3.3 Discounting of Credits 
Different approaches to expand the CDM’s 
scope beyond a pure offsetting mechanism 
have been discussed in recent years. One op­
tion particularly looked at is discounting of 
offsets. To date for every reduced tonne of 
CO2e one CER is being issued which entitles its 
owner to emit one tonne of CO2e. By adding a 
discount factor either a project could receive 
less than one CER per tonne CO2e abated or 
implemented on the demand-side every instal­
lation or country with emission reduction 
obligation could be obliged to surrender more 
than one CER per tonne CO2e emitted.
Potentially, the introduction of a discount factor 
could fundamentally alter the supply-demand 
balance on the carbon market. A discount 
factor of 2 implemented on the supply side 
would effectively cut CER supply in half. The 
introduction of such a discount would, howev­
er, affect project developers since they would 
receive only half the CERs to sell. On the other 
hand, the effect of increasing prices could abate 
this effect to some extent.  
However, implementing discounting factors on 
the supply side could proof difficult. It would 
require a fundamental overhaul of the CDM 
regulations including the Marrakech Accords. It 
is not plausible that this can be achieved timely 
enough to address the acute crisis of interna­
tional carbon markets. Furthermore, imple­
mented on the supply side, a discount factor 
would very likely only affect future projects and 
thus future supply. Current supply would in this
case not be addressed.
More feasible could be the implementation of 
discount factors on the demand side. Countries 
could commit themselves (unilaterally) to 
surrender e. g. two CERs per tonne CO2e emit­
ted and oblige regulated entities, e. g. EU-ETS 
installations, to do so. This would effectively 
double CER demand and could fundamentally
alter the balance of supply and demand.  
However, the implementation of a discounting 
factor on the demand side would as a matter of 
fact increase the level of ambition as described 
above, although without additional domestic 
mitigation commitments. For the introduction 
of discount factors on the demand side, there­
fore, holds the same argumentation as for 
increased ambition as discussed above.
3.4 Limiting supply by applying 
ambitious baselines 
Currently, each CDM project has to develop a 
business as usual scenario that actual project 
emissions are subtracted from to calculate 
emission reductions. A way to generate atmos­
pheric benefits atop of offsets would be to 
depart from business as usual as crediting 
baseline and instead use a more ambitious 
scenario. Determining credits by using a scenar­
io that is a given percentage below the busi­
ness as usual scenario, each project would 



























Lukas Hermwille – Wuppertal Institute 
Again, project developers would dispose of less 
CERs but could likely sell them at higher prices.
Unlike the introduction of a discount factor,
such an approach could eliminate part of the 
CDM potential. All projects that generate addi­
tional emission reductions only slightly above 
BAU but not enough to fall under the more 
ambitious crediting baseline would fall off the 
CDM pipeline.
The introduction of ambitious crediting base­
lines would require a substantial overhaul of 
the CDM system including its methodologies.
Furthermore, such a revision would very likely 
apply only to future projects and thus only limit 
future CER supply. Although the measure could 
improve the mechanism’s environmental integ­
rity and could be a meaningful evolution of the 
CDM system, it is not considered to be suitable 
to address the current supply-demand crisis.
3.5 Limiting CDM projects to
only one crediting period.
The CDM foresees that projects can request the 
renewal of crediting period once the project 
has reached the end of its first crediting period.
A possible way to dramatically cut CER supply 
would be to prohibit the renewal of the credit­
ing period. The time for such a measure is right 
as numerous projects of the early phase of the 
CDM are now approaching the end of their first 
crediting period.
However, this would mean a retroactive change 
of the rules of the CDM as laid down in the 
Marrakech Accords. On the one hand this 
would require a cumbersome political process 
to be decided. On the other hand it would 
certainly cause strong resistance from the 
project developers community as it would rob 
the regulative basis they based their invest­
ment on.
The measure, though potent enough to signifi­
cantly alter the supply-demand imbalance,
would send a devastating signal to the market 
hampering future investment in CDM projects.
3.6 Temporary halt of issuance
of credits 
Certainly the most drastic approach to limiting
supply of offsets would be to temporarily halt
the issuance of credits. This measure would 
certainly have an immediate and drastic effect 
on CER prices. However, it is not clear in what 
direction. On the one hand CERs would imme­
diately become a scarce good and this should 
lead to rising prices.
On the other hand current CER prices are to a 
large degree speculative prices that are not 
based on actual costs but rather on buyers’
expectations of future demand, supply and 
relevance of the mechanism and its credits. A 
halt of issuance of CERs would be a radical
intervention in the market. It would severely 
hamper investors’ faith in the mechanism itself. 
Market actors could perceive such extreme
measure as a lead towards non-continuation of 
the CDM and the offsetting concept on the 
international level. Consequently, if current 
prices are purely speculative and if the market 
loses faith in the future of the market, prices 
would immediately collapse.
On the other hand, with CER prices falling to 
the bottom some argue that the market has 
already collapsed. As part of a policy package 
together with measures that signal a continua­
tion of the CDM, a clearly communicated and 
temporally limited halt of issuance of credits 
could provide first aid to the markets.
However, as a single-handed measure a tempo­
rary halt of issuance of credits is not considered 
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4 Conclusions  
On the supply and demand side 14 different 
options to stabilize market prices were identi­
fied in this paper. These options were analysed 
regarding their potential to do so along three 
main criteria: their quantitative impact, their 
signalling effect for the future of the carbon 
market and their political and market accepta­
bility. Central pros and cons for every option are 
summarized in a table below.
Only two of the presented options are potent 
enough to single-handedly revitalize interna­
tional carbon markets: a strong boost of the 
level of ambition of emission reduction targets 
or the introduction of a sufficiently large fund 
such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to create 
additional and continuous demand. Both 
measures would send a signal to carbon mar­
kets that would very likely be bold enough to 
restore the market’s faith in the future of the 
CDM and would thus bring CER prices back to a 
more healthy level. 
Both options face, however, severe drawbacks. 
An international agreement with increased 
level of ambition seems unlikely. Furthermore,
with the adoption of the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol in Doha 2012, a 
window of opportunity for increased ambition 
has been closed. The Kyoto Protocol was 
amended with a paragraph that requests a 
review process to evaluate the adequacy of the 
emission reduction obligations by 2014, but 
this process will not start soon enough to pro­
vide the short-term signal that is needed. 
The second option, the use of financial flows of 
the GCF to purchase excess CERs is probably 
easier to implement, but would have profound 
consequences for the future of the UNFCCC 
process. The GCF is meant to channel funding 
from developed countries to support adapta­
tion and mitigation measures in developing 
countries. Installing a fixed price for carbon 
emission reductions is under discussion as one 
means to provide a stable incentive. However, a 
carbon floor price managed by the GCF is
hardly plausible under current climate policy 
realities, given the amounts of funding that 
would be required.
In addition, by purchasing excess CERs from the 
secondary market financial flows would be 
directed mainly to large industrial gas and 
power projects in emerging economies such as 
China, India and Brazil as these host the vast 
majority of CDM projects. Also, if the GCF simp­
ly buys secondary market CERs, an evaluation of 
the needs of support and the appropriateness 
of efforts is no longer possible. The GCF would 
therefore revert from the principle of appropri­
ateness of support in doing so. 
While certainly many important lessons can be
learned from the CDM, especially regarding its 
approach towards measurement, reporting and 
verifying of emission reductions, a simple 
adoption of the CDM by the GCF would carry 
over and expand many of the mechanism’s 
problems such as uneven geographical distri­
bution and repeatedly doubted environmental
integrity. 
By implementing robust selection criteria in the 
GCF and reverting to primary carbon markets 
the above mentioned downsides can be miti­
gated or even overcome. However, focusing on 
certain regions (e.g. LDCs and SIDS) and/or on 
project types / modalities (PoAs and projects 
integrated into national NAMA strategies) 
which provide a perspective that is in line with
what is desired for a future climate change 
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potential to stabilize the carbon market as a 
whole.
Yet if it is not the goal to stabilize the current
markets as a whole but instead to provide a 
bridge for institutions and project developers in
specific regions to overcome the current trou­
bles, the utilisation of the GCF deserves a closer 
look.
Other options, including the extended use of 
CERs in voluntary markets, ETSs outside the 
Kyoto Protocol for voluntary emission reduc­
tions beyond compliance goals and restrictions 
on the supply-side of the international carbon 
markets have the potential to move interna­
tional carbon markets in the right direction, but 
are too small in scale or the effect would take 
place too far in the future to restore the balance 
of supply and demand single-handedly in the 
short term. To what extent a package of com­
bined smaller measures can restore faith in the 
CDM is beyond the scope of this paper. A quan­
titative analysis of each individual measure’s 
impact on supply and demand respectively 
could provide an indication.
Applying more ambitious crediting baselines 
and/or introducing a discount factor both could 
mean a significant improvement of the CDM.
They would move the CDM beyond a pure 
offsetting mechanism and thus improve its 
environmental integrity. However, both options 
require a fundamental revision of the CDM and 
are thus available only on a long-term perspec­
tive. 
Limiting CDM projects to only one crediting 
period could have a more direct effect on CER 
supply but would require an equally cumber­
some implementation process. Furthermore, it
would probably provoke strong resistance from 
project developers and hamper future invest­
ments in the CDM.
An exception could be the implementation of a 
discount factor on the demand side. The EU for 
example could unilaterally commit itself to
surrender more then one CER per tonne CO2e 
emitted or introduce a discount factor for the 
use of CERs in the EU ETS. This measure could 
boost demand and address the supply-demand 
imbalance. However, such a measure would be 
just a different approach on how to implement 
more ambitious targets. It is therefore subject 
to the same argumentation as the one on 
increased targets discussed above.
Some of the options are not considered to be 
helpful in the current situation. A temporary 
halt of issuance of credits would likely take 
away any remaining faith in the mechanism and 
result in a complete collapse of the CER market 
if implemented without any other measures 
that provide a long-term perspective for the 
carbon market. The introduction of a CER re­
serve bank would be difficult to implement in
the international context and will likely not
have a lasting effect on carbon prices as long as 
the mandate of such institution is limited to
strategically buying and selling CERs instead of 
directly controlling credit supply. Such an 
institution would not be able to address the 
structural imbalance of supply and demand.
It also bears noting that some argue that the 
CDM in its current form will always have an
oversupply problem because the potential for 
generating credits will always be much greater 
than what industrialised countries can absorb.
However, attempts to restrict the CDM to cer­
tain project types have failed in the past and it 
therefore seems unlikely that any such agree­
ment will be possible now.  
Another route to achieving the same effect 
would be if current seller countries became 
buyers of CERs, through adopting binding 
commitments and/or establishing domestic 
emission trading systems. However, this rather 
seems a prospect for the next decade at the 
earliest, given that China has just pushed back 
the development of a national ETS and discus­
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Summary of options to stabilize carbon markets
Demand-side options 
+ strong signal to carbon markets 
1) More ambitious targets + additional long-term demand 
- unlikely to be agreed upon 
2) Extended use for compliance - low potential due to lack of ambition 
+ easy to implement voluntarily
3) Extended use for non-compliance goals + target-oriented support of projects is possible 
- sufficient scale unlikely in the face of budgetary and economic crisis 
+ potentially large sources of additional long-term demand 
4) CER use in emerging ETSs outside the + ETS covered sectors form no longer CDM potential 
Kyoto Protocol – little interest by implementing countries to make use of CERs 
– only mid- to long-term perspective 
+ potential for increased use 
5) CER use in voluntary markets 	 – small volume of voluntary markets is not sufficient to address supply­
demand imbalance 
6) Introduction of a Fund or use of the GCF 
+ GCF is potentially large enough to create sufficient demand 
+ short-term availability 
+ target-oriented support for specific project types, regions or modali­
ties if strong eligibility criteria are applied 
– NAMA principles not reflected when CERs are purchased from sec­
ondary markets 
– further market fragmentation if only selected (primary market) CERs 
are eligible 
– no possibility to alter absolute supply-demand balance 
7) Introduction of a CER reserve bank – little chance to abate price volatility due to speculative nature of CER 
prices 
– unclear up-front financing of the bank
– unilateral floor prices distort market prices 
8) Introduction of a floor price – do not increase but decrease demand for offsets 
– global floor price would require fundamental makeover of the CDM 
Supply-side options 
+ reduced supply 
+ easy implementation 
9) Restriction of eligibility of projects – no clear signal on the future of the mechanism
– limiting the mechanisms potential 
- unlikely to be agreed on 
10) Rigorous assessment of projects 
+ improved environmental integrity
– no short-term effect since only future projects are affected
+ significantly reduced supply or increased demand
+ improved environmental integrity 
+ implementation possible unilaterally on the demand side
– implementation on the supply side requires fundamental revision of 
the CDM modalities and procedures 
– requires additional ambition that is unlikely in the face of the fiscal 
crisis 
11) Discounting of Credits 
+ reduced supply 
+ improved environmental integrity
– implementation would require overhaul of CDM and its methodolo­
gies 
– would apply for future CER supply only
– only long-term effects 
12) Application of ambitious baselines 
+ strong impact on CER supply 
13) Limiting projects to one crediting period – difficult to implement politically 
– strong resistance from project developers 
– no signal for long-term perspective 
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